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S U M M A R Y  Tansel’s contribution to the debate dissects the concept of passive revolution and high-
lights the signiicance of understanding passive revolutions as concrete historical episodes of mobil-
isation and state formation. 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PA S S I V E  R E V O L U T I O N S  I N  T H E  P E R I P H E R I E S
My contribution to this debate will focus on three interlinked fault lines that threaten to destabilise 
De Smet’s otherwise impressive exegesis on Gramsci and the historical materialist analytical tools 
he utilises to interpret social and political change. Accordingly, the following review is thematically 
structured around (I) De Smet’s conceptualisation of passive revolutions, (II) his engagement with 
Marx’s historical method and the question of Eurocentrism, and inally (III) an excursus into the 
case of the late Ottoman/Turkish state formation which I will briely unpack to highlight a number 
of tensions in De Smet’s theoretical framework and empirical analysis. 
C L A S S I F Y I N G  A N D  D E P LO Y I N G  PA S S I V E  R E V O L U T I O N S 

Gramsci on Tahrir is positioned as a contribution ‘to the ield of Gramsci studies and especially to 
the discussion of his [Gramsci’s] notion of Caesarism’. De Smet underlines that the book is con-
cerned directly with ‘deploy[ing]’ Gramsci’s concepts to help us understand and explain contempo-
rary issues (3).  Such an analytical strategy is strongly aligned with Gramsci’s own modus operandi 2
which is marked by an explicit adherence to absolute historicism, i.e., an approach to ‘locating ideas 
both in and beyond their context’ (Morton 2007a, 17). De Smet, thus, closely follows Gramsci’s own 
approach to historical analysis by retracing and reconstructing concepts designed in/inluenced by 
speciic historical conjunctures. While the book presents Caesarism as the main concept at the 
heart of this reconstruction, I would argue that Caesarism is elevated to this primary position only 
because the concept of passive revolution remains underdeveloped in De Smet’s framework. his 
drawback then gives birth to De Smet’s eﬀorts to ill subsequent lacunae with a rather ‘over-extend-
ed’ conception of Caesarism (cf. Callinicos 2010, 492). 
 In terms of the structure of the argument, the book’s main thrust into the labyrinthine ap-
plications of Gramsci’s concepts revolves around the Italian communist’s arguably most perplexing 
device: passive revolution. De Smet’s reconstruction of the conceptual arsenal oﬀered by Gramsci 
(oten via Marx, Engels and Lenin) – inter alia hegemony, Caesarism, Bonapartism and wars of 
position and movement – rests on a particular conception of passive revolution as ‘a criterion of 
interpretation’ (85; Gramsci 1971, 114, Q15§62). Given the widespread adoption and appropriation 
of the concept in the recent critical literature on the Middle East, it is not surprising that De Smet 
recognises the chameleon-like characteristics of the term and diligently retraces the multiplex ways 
in which it is deployed in Gramsci’s writings.  De Smet wants us to consider passive revolution not 3
as a ‘thing’, but as a historical ‘theme’ and a ‘political programme’ (68–69). Rejecting a monolithic 
projection of the term as a ‘model’ or ‘type’ of modernisation, he contends that passive revolution 
should be interpreted as a ‘methodological searchlight’ that ‘highlights the agency and agility of the 
dominant groups in the process of the class struggle’ (70, 68–69). According to De Smet, the failure 
to do so results in emptying the concept of its analytical value: 
 Unless otherwise noted, all in-text citations refer to De Smet (2016).2
 he heterogeneous and oten contradictory applications of the concept surface in the analyses of wide-3
ranging processes from the development of Political Islam to the adoption of neoliberal reforms (Butko 
2004; Tuğal 2009, 2012; Munif 2013).
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When used as a concept to discern a clearly delineated type of process, passive revolution tends to be-
come an empty signiier, applicable to all cases of transition, elite-driven transformation, or reformism. If 
everything since the French Revolution can be categorized as a passive revolution, nothing is a passive 
revolution. (68) 
 De Smet is right to call for a consistent and tightly contextualised interpretation of the concept, 
the absence of which has created in diﬀerent branches of the social sciences a bewildering spectrum 
of meanings and adaptations.  he corollary of such a conceptual polysemy is the creation of a term 4
that, to paraphrase Marx, explains everything but teaches us nothing (cf. Marx 1992, 323). I am thus 
largely on the same page with De Smet on the necessity of perceiving the concept as a ‘criterion of 
interpretation’. Yet, unlike De Smet, I also recognise passive revolutions as concrete historical 
episodes of blocked revolutionary upheavals and class strategies that result in the constitution or 
reproduction of the capitalist mode of production. From the Mexican Revolution of 1910–11 to the 
1908 Young Turk Revolution in the Ottoman Empire, the trajectory of capitalist state formation is 
riddled with historical moments that brought about concrete manifestations of passive revolution-
ary strategies, tendencies and outcomes that deined and redeined the constitution of capitalist 
social relations and the capitalist state. Just as De Smet refers to the 1848 revolutions, Paris Com-
mune in 1871 and the Russian Revolution of 1917 as harbingers of permanent revolution (70–71), 
the Mexican and Young Turk revolutions signal the embodiments of passive revolutionary dynam-
ics. Analysing how these events – many of which were marked, at least in the irst instance, by revo-
lutionary ruptures and subaltern mobilisations – were ‘displaced’ (125, 137, 168) and paved the way 
for the constitution/reproduction of the emergent capitalist state forms is important not only for 
theoretical clarity and historical accuracy but also for illuminating contemporary political ques-
tions that confront progressive and/or anti-capitalist social movements and radical politics. 
 De Smet’s rejection of passive revolution as a ‘type’ or ‘model’ of transition to/reproduction of 
capitalism is also discordant with Gramsci’s own discussion. Gramsci marks the diﬀerences be-
tween the archetypal French model and the ‘successive waves’ of state formation in nineteenth-cen-
tury Europe by claiming that the latter processes ‘were made up of a combination of social strug-
gles, interventions from above of the enlightened monarchy type, and national wars’ (Gramsci 
1971, 115, Q10II§61). he conceptualisation of these processes as ‘passive revolutions’ is captured 
in his speculative passage on the ‘concept of passive revolution’ where he considers whether the 
term ‘applies not only to Italy but also to those countries that modernise the state through a series 
of reforms or national wars without undergoing a political revolution of a radical Jacobin-
type’ (Gramsci 1996, 232, Q4§57). His eﬀort to link the politically and socio-spatially divergent 
examples of state formation in Europe leads him to advance passive revolutionary transitions as a 
‘model’ of producing capitalist hegemony, and hence his question: ‘Can this “model” for the cre-
ation of the modern states be repeated in other conditions?’ (Gramsci 1971, 115, Q10II§61). As 
Adam Morton and Peter homas have highlighted, at this juncture, passive revolution comes to 
epitomise ‘a logic of (a certain type) of modernization’ (homas 2006, 73; Morton 2007b, 601). 
 Compare, for example, the widely diﬀering applications of Gramscian concepts in Landy (2008), Beasley-4
Murray (2010) and Tuğal (2009). See also Morton (2012, 2013) and Buttigieg (2005) for discussions of 
interpretative diﬀerences and their consequences.
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 De Smet’s insistence on perceiving the concept exclusively as a methodological tool thus blocks 
an appreciation of the ‘speciic class strategies and spatial practices that characterize capitalist soci-
ety and how these have changed with the further development of capitalism’ (Morton 2011, 243). 
Furthermore, it also distorts his empirical analysis to the extent that at least one of the key revolu-
tionary moments he urges us to examine ‘by deploying the criterion of passive revolution’ (125) 
fails to meet the criteria he sets out for himself. By adopting Morton’s call to conceive of the ‘con-
tinuum of passive revolution’ as ‘concrete historical instances in which aspects of the social rela-
tions of capitalist development are either instituted and/or expanded’ (Morton 2010, 316), De Smet 
accepts that such ‘historical instances’ have to establish or reproduce capitalist social relations (69). 
Yet De Smet’s discussion of the 1919 revolution in Egypt culminates in a conclusion that unequivo-
cally denies the manifestation of such an outcome: 
Popular initiative from below was displaced not only by the reform from above of the British colonial 
state, but also by the conservative landlords who directed the nationalist movement. here was no Ja-
cobin faction that pushed the movement to complete political emancipation: full national sovereignty, 
eradication of feudal relations, and a democratic republic. Instead of overthrowing and transforming the 
colonial historical bloc, the landowners merely renegotiated the relations of power to their advantage. 
(125) 
De Smet further reiterates that the events in 1919 did little to strengthen or expand capitalist social 
relations in Egypt: 
he failure of national capitalists to industrialize the economy, and the consolidation of the power of 
domestic commercial capitalists, large estate holders, the Palace, and foreign inancial capital, revealed 
that Egypt in the irst half of the twentieth century was not a social formation moving gradually and 
naturally towards ‘full’ capitalism, but an unstable combination of national capitalist and precapitalist 
forms subordinated to international monopoly capital. (131) 
Consequently, while De Smet is right to suggest a passive revolutionary ‘displacement’ of revolu-
tionary demands by imperialist forces and ruling classes, his refusal to recognise passive revolu-
tionary ‘models’ of capitalist transition/reproduction leads him to miss how those acts of displace-
ment did not – by De Smet’s own admission – entrench the capitalist mode of production in Egypt. 
 he analyses of the subsequent episodes of revolution–restoration in Egypt are further troubled 
by an incomplete portrayal of passive revolution as De Smet concludes that ‘[t]he political trajecto-
ry of Egypt shows the nonsensicality of passive revolution as a speciic, clearly delineated type of 
capitalist transition’ (168, original emphasis). Yet he immediately qualiies this statement by arguing 
that 
he 1919 revolution, the 1952 Free Oﬃcers’ coup, and Sadat’s Initah are not cosmetic iterations of basi-
cally the same phenomenon. Instead what emerges is a cascade of qualitatively diﬀerent passive revolu-
tions, or, more correctly, a historical process for which the concept of passive revolution highlights the 
various forms in which the dynamic of permanent revolution is replaced by initiative from above. (168, 
emphasis added) 
Curiously, De Smet does not seem to recognise that the ‘type’ or ‘model’ of passive revolution 
Gramsci invokes in his above-cited fourth and tenth notebooks corresponds precisely to such 
‘forms in which the dynamic of permanent revolution is replaced by initiative from above’. De 
Smet’s insistence on understanding this ‘type’ or ‘model’ as a homogeneous and potentially instru-
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mentalist class strategy to facilitate a ‘transition’ to capitalism prevents him from capturing the mul-
tiplicity of the forms with which such a transition can take place and be conceptualised as part of a 
common historical dynamic (i.e., passive revolution). Precisely because of this conundrum, De 
Smet resorts to Caesarism to ill in the gaps in his analysis and claims, for example, that ‘Caesarism 
appears as a necessary conceptual addition to passive revolution in order to understand the ambi-
guity and complexity of the Nasserist episode’ (169; see also Salem in this issue). here is no doubt 
that Caesarist interventions can complement passive revolutionary episodes;  yet De Smet’s analysis 5
essentially reduces passive revolution into a mere methodological criterion to analyse various forms 
of Caesarisms rather than positioning the latter as a ‘speciic political form’ (Gramsci 1971, 215, 
Q13§23) that may or may not accompany passive revolutions (101).  6
T A K I N G  E U R O C E N T R I S M  ( A N D  I T S  M A R X I S T  C R I T I C S )  S E R I O U S LY 

Notwithstanding the above critique of De Smet’s conceptualisation of passive revolutions, Gramsci 
on Tahrir excels at constructing a thorough engagement with Gramsci’s corpus and the broader 
historical materialist canon on revolutions and social and political change. It is thus surprising to 
see that the book fails to establish a similar dialogue with the contemporary literature on Marxist 
historiography and the rich debates on universalism, Eurocentrism and post-colonial interventions. 
Preempting the charges of transposing concepts drawn from European history onto a potentially 
incompatible non-Western case, De Smet defends the universality of historical materialist method 
and reassures us that ‘a concern for Eurocentrism is misplaced’ (7). his guarantee, however, is re-
peatedly undermined throughout the text as the analysis lacks a constructive dialogue with Marxist 
critiques of Eurocentrism and reduces Marx’s own theory of history into a linear progression of 
modes of productions. 
 De Smet’s conception of the emergence and development of capitalism displays strong aﬃnities 
with Robert Brenner’s social property relations approach (21). De Smet claims that ‘with the rise of 
capitalism and the forceful integration of diﬀerent parts of the world into the emerging global mar-
ket economy separate histories became for the irst time a shared world history’ (7–8, emphasis 
added; also 111, 114). Resorting to what I would call a literal reading of the mode of production 
schema found in Marx’s Preface to A contribution to the critique of political economy, De Smet 
claims that, for Marx and Engels, this universalisation was a necessary stage as it created ‘an abso-
lute material base for a new society’ i.e., the future communist society (111). While De Smet high-
 See, for example, Cox (1983, 166); Gowan (2005, 12); Öncü (2003).5
 I vehemently reject Joel Beinin’s claim that De Smet’s work is ‘obscurantist’ or that it suﬀers from ‘over-6
theorization’. Yet I ind myself agreeing with his claim that in De Smet’s analysis, Caesarism ‘[applies] to 
everything that has happened in Egypt since 1952’. See the exchanges in Beinin (2014) and De Smet (2014) 
where the latter argues that passive revolution should be understood as ‘a methodological device to inves-
tigate the contemporary and historical process’. Given the mediatory role of Trotsky’s deployment of Cae-
sarism on De Smet’s analysis (cf. Trotsky 1972, 277), a brief discussion of the shortcomings of Trotsky’s 
own conceptualisation could have greatly clariied the scope and validity of the concept (see Bergman 
1987, 94).
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lights the inherent problems in the Preface formula,  he does not adequately challenge or go be7 -
yond his conclusion that ‘Marx and Engels stressed the necessity of a capitalist and bourgeois 
“stage” in the world-historical transition towards communism’ (112). 
 I argue that De Smet overlooks the focal point of the recent Marxist critiques of Eurocentrism. 
he materialist critiques of Eurocentrism – a group in which I position my own work  – do not 8
articulate a normative critique today, nor do they challenge the key role of the West in constituting 
global capitalism. What the contemporary critique aims to demonstrate is the historical deiciencies 
of the argument that the universalisation of history concurred exclusively with the development of 
Western capitalism. Instead, the critique posits that the emergence and development of capitalism 
itself materialised within an existing global history, the interwoven connections of which under-
pinned both the mercantile networks and the precapitalist social and property relations that were 
absorbed or, to varying degrees, aﬀected by industrial capitalism. Marxists should not, of course, 
forget that ‘[i]t is the universal commoditisation of labour power and the universalisation of wage 
labour that also deines the moment of emergence of the world market and globalisation, which is 
not to be conlated with the mere existence or extension of trade routes’ (Kaiwar 2014, 293). But 
this premise should not preclude the analysis of historical processes within which the building 
blocks of the capitalist mode of production existed in geographically and temporally distinct con-
texts. 
 Does this mean that Marxist critics of Eurocentrism are trying to have their non-Eurocentric 
Marxist cake and eat it too? One could suggest that historical materialism is inherently Eurocentric 
and any eﬀort to confront this Eurocentrism would result in a considerable degree of separation 
from Marxist tenets (see, for example, Hobson 2011, 148). Yet this could only be a valid claim if we 
wholly ignore how Marx’s own corpus provides a wealth of evidence to formulate a non-Eurocen-
tric yet universalist historical method. While De Smet’s reading of the Preface formula creates an 
immediate barrier to theorising non-Western/non-capitalist development – which De Smet accu-
rately recognises – this does not mean that Marx advocated a strict ‘stagism’, i.e., the view that so-
cio-economic development materialises as a linear succession of modes of organisation that all so-
cieties have to go through and experience in a similar, if not the same, manner. On the contrary, 
Marx’s treatment of the development of capitalism from his London Notebooks to Ethnological 
Notebooks is geared towards explaining the ‘multilinear character of historical 
development’ (Vitkin 1982, 63).  While the Preface formula seems to suggest a unilinear stagism in 9
which capitalism is perceived as a necessary predecessor of a future communist society, Marx clari-
ied this claim as a historical exposition speciic to the trajectory of Western Europe, not a general 
theoretical principle. Indicatively, in his exchange with Vera Zasulich, Marx quotes from Capital 
that ‘the metamorphosis of feudal production into capital production’ was engendered by ‘the expro-
priation of the agricultural producer’ and that ‘all other countries of Western Europe are undergoing 
 ‘he problem with this view was, irst, that it cast the subaltern struggles of bygone ages into a tragically 7
determinist light, as they were doomed to fail due to the absolute deiciency of their material base – which 
was only discovered in the age of capitalism’ (111).
 Inter alia, Anderson (2010); Brown (2010); Lindner (2010); Nişancıoğlu (2013). See Tansel (2013, 2015a) 8
for extensive discussions of the importance of articulating a Marxist critique of Eurocentrism.
 See Marx (1972), Pradella (2015, 92–122), and Tansel (2015a, 91–93).9
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the same process’; yet he quickly underscores that he ‘expressly limited this “historical inevitability” 
to the “countries of Western Europe”’ (1989a; 1989b, 360; 1989c, 370; 1976, 876, original emphasis). 
Consequently, in contrast to De Smet’s characterisation of modes of productions as abstractions 
that embody ‘the universal and static character[s]’ of socio-economic systems (17), Marx’s theory of 
history perceives such systems as inherently dynamic ensembles that are not predestined to follow 
each other in a sequential manner. he transition in the Ottoman Empire and early Republican 
Turkey represents this messiness and problematises De Smet’s conception of capitalist development. 
D I A G N O S I N G  T H E  P E R I P H E R I E S  W I T H  PA S S I V E  R E V O L U T I O N S 

In the inal part of this review, I would like bring into focus another important state formation case 
in the Middle East, the parallel development of the capitalist state in Turkey. I should preface the 
following comments with the proviso that I do not aim to overemphasise De Smet’s brief comments 
on the Turkish case. he book’s main focus is ultimately Egypt and De Smet only references Turkey 
in several points to highlight the comparative utility of his concepts. Still, I would argue that these 
brief allusions heighten the tensions in De Smet’s analysis rather than demonstrating the applicabil-
ity and validity of his main arguments. As such, I highlight the problematic insertion of Turkey as a 
comparative case not because it detracts from his discussion on Egypt but precisely because it 
throws into sharp relief the questions about passive revolution and Eurocentrism that the book 
struggles to answer. 
 he tension between De Smet’s reading of passive revolutions and his prioritisation of Cae-
sarism I outlined in the irst section manifests once again in his brief discussion of the Turkish tra-
jectory. While, in an earlier discussion, De Smet convincingly deconstructs Neil Davidson’s reasser-
tion of the bourgeois character of ‘bourgeois revolutions’ (76, 82), he curiously goes on to adopt 
Davidson’s problematic historical categorisation regarding the position of non-Western states in the 
‘uneven and combined’ expansion of capitalism. Echoing the above-discussed stagism, De Smet 
claims that nineteenth-century European transformations turned ‘the fragmented history of the 
world’ into ‘world history’ (114), yet countries such as Russia and the Ottoman Empire, who re-
mained outside the European epicentre of world revolution, were ‘threatened by Western military 
successes [and] engaged in a limited industrialization from above’ (116–117; see Davidson 2009, 
14). his dynamic, to De Smet, suggests that those countries witnessed a distorted modernisation 
as – echoing Trotsky – he claims that ‘sometimes more advanced forms were debased when they 
were embedded in a backward context, which paradoxically led to a strengthening of these back-
wards conditions instead of revolutionising them’ (116–117). he corollary of these twisting paths 
of capitalist accommodation is the emergence of variegated trajectories of social and political 
change in the region. Building on his adoption of Davidson’s account, De Smet oﬀers the following 
account in an eﬀort to demonstrate the multiplicity of passages to the capitalist statehood in the 
Middle East: 
Developments in Turkey and Iran presented other trajectories. Although these nations were never for-
mally colonized, they were dominated by foreign interests, and their modernization eﬀorts were blocked, 
particularly as a result of the struggle for power between Britain and Russia. he Young Turks [sic] led by 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938) turned the crisis and collapse of the Ottoman Empire into an op-
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portunity to establish a modern nation, renegotiating the relation between national capital and imperial-
ism. Similarly to the Russian case, the Young Turks [sic] were able to push back imperialism by militarily 
defeating the Western-supported Sultanate. he Kemalist transformation from above fulilled all the 
‘historical tasks’ of the bourgeois revolution, but in a Bonapartist way, without a bourgeoisie leading a 
popular revolt from above. (136) 
De Smet continues his rebuttal of the passive revolutionary ‘model’ of transition by claiming that 
the historical experience of Japan, Russia, Turkey and Iran ‘illustrate that a conceptualization of 
passive revolution as a clearly delineated type of modernization – instead of an interpretative crite-
rion – runs into contradictions’ (137). I would speculate that a passive revolutionary reading of 
such ‘models’ would not, in fact, face any contradictions if De Smet had deployed a more accurate 
historical perspective and refrained from equalising passive revolutionary ‘types’ of transition with 
a single, undiﬀerentiated class strategy. Indeed, De Smet’s reduction of the Ottoman trajectory into 
a narrative of ‘defensive modernisation’ obscures precisely the type of molecular changes in social 
relations that a Marxist account should aim to uncover (Tansel 2015a, 89–91).  As De Smet is un10 -
able to detect the social and political changes in the Ottoman social formation, he ignores the key 
revolutionary period – the Revolution of 1908 – that presents, arguably, one of the most pertinent 
examples of a passive revolutionary ‘model’ of capitalist state formation.  11
 Contravening the depictions of a conventional ‘revolution from above’, the Revolution of 1908 
marked an immense upsurge in grassroots mobilisation and the organisation of collectives that 
represented the diﬀerent, and oten competing, interests of the various classes and communities 
within the empire. hese groups – ranging from women’s collectives and striking workers to non-
Muslim communities – all perceived the revolutionary interval as a window of opportunity to re-
assert their claims or seek greater rights. While their inability to coalesce into organisations/move-
ments with deined goals and eﬀective strategies that could eﬀect long-term social change is all too 
clear, this failure should not lead to their outright dismissal on the fact that they were not explicitly 
clad in the mantles of established ideologies; e.g., that they did not espouse ‘socialist 
consciousness’ (Tunçay 1978, 31). Keeping in mind Gramsci’s observation that ‘[t]he history of 
subaltern social groups is necessarily fragmented and episodic’ (Gramsci 1971, 54–55, Q25§2), a 
more appropriate lens with which to perceive these mobilisations is to position them as ‘sponta-
neous movements born of a revolutionary situation, of an intensiication of the struggle and of an 
intense concentration of working-class energy’ (Luxemburg quoted in Frölich 1940, 167). 
 De Smet’s account – and the broader canon in which he positions his account – can capture 
neither the ‘forcible entrance of the masses into the realm of rulership over their own 
destiny’ (Trotsky 2008, XV) in 1908 nor the fact that Committee of Union and Progress fulilled a 
Jacobin function by politically and militarily organising opposition against the state. he omission 
of this period then forces De Smet to shit the revolutionary dynamic to 1923, to the anti-imperial-
ist struggle deined by the coalition of various resistance forces. It is, again, no surprise that De 
 In De Smet’s account, Egypt’s pre-colonial socio-economic trajectory is also strikingly detached from the 10
coeval Ottoman reforms in the nineteenth century – the analysis of which would have created productive 
points of entry to a discussion of capitalist development in the region.
 he following account is developed and discussed in detail in Tansel (2015b).11
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Smet paints the Kemalist regime as a ‘Bonapartist’ intervention rather than the political manifesta-
tion of a passive revolutionary dynamic that began more than a decade ago in the Ottoman Empire. 
C O N C L U S I O N 

Gramsci on Tahrir demonstrates clearly the continuing importance and utility of reading and inter-
preting Gramsci for contemporary political praxis (Morton 2012). he three fault lines I have iden-
tiied in this review are not issues that uniquely trouble De Smet’s otherwise admirable work, but 
the reverberations of a broader current of debate and relection in the historical materialist canon. 
As such, De Smet’s carefully reconstructed exposition of revolutionary change would have been all 
the more remarkable had the analysis taken those debates into account and pushed the boundaries 
of its theoretical and historical assumptions. 
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